http://www.nakedintelligence.org/feeds/news.xml sv-se by Infosphere AB,  On Sunday, August 15, a young couple was stoned to death in Kunduz province in northern Afghanistan. The deaths of Khayaam (25) and Siddiqa (19) was confirmed by Afghan authorities on Monday and Amnesty International said it was the first confirmed stoning since the US-led invasion toppled the Taliban-regime in late 2001. The stoning was punishment for the “crime” of wanting to marry without permission.  The tragic and brutal deaths carried out by around 200 male villagers (in the local bazaar in Mullah Quli) is to be seen as yet another proof that the Taliban is gaining strength around the country, including the north where they have made inroads for the past few years. The imposition of Sharia-based punishments, like stoning, is part and parcel of how the Taliban is increasing their hold over the Afghan population. The fact that the murders took place in an area (the Archi district of the Kunduz province) where the Afghan government is weak is another sign of the difficulties that the corrupt central government in Kabul is having in establishing its writ over the country as a whole. It has become increasingly common for the Taliban “to rule the night” as the saying goes, meaning that even if there might be international or Afghan forces close by (which was not the case in Archi), the intimidation tactics by the Taliban seems to work. A string of murders, often brutal, of individuals who have dared to publicly support either the central government and/or the international presence, has shown the Afghans that they cannot necessarily be protected if they dare cross the Taliban. The stonings in Kunduz was the latest in a series of cases where local Taliban commanders have imposed their harsh and brutal version of the Islamic law, Sharia, for local “crimes”. The fact that this continues to happen despite the presence of large foreign forces in the country show how effective the Taliban has been in regaining influence.  Apart from the fact that the main victim of this “re-talibanization” of Afghanistan, are Afghan women – a fact that in itself should force the international community to seriously question how the war is conducted – an even larger issue is the question of what kind of implications for the efforts to reconcile with the Taliban, that has been initiated during the past year, this trend will carry. Afghan officials, and their western allies, have demanded that their Taliban interlocutors accept the Afghan constitution (that outlaws punishments like stoning and amputations), something so far at least, resisted by the Taliban. The war-weariness on part of the Afghans and the west alike has made resistance against the Taliban weaker, and there is a danger that in order to get some kind of peace and an end to the fighting, women’s rights will be sacrificed. The stonings in Kunduz, in the hitherto rather calm north, show that this potential conflict between women’s rights and an end to the fighting is a very real one. http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=105 Wed, 18 Aug 2010 22:15:00 CEST By Infosphere AB When several members of the US congress moved to block further aid to the Lebanese Army (LAF) in early August, it was just the last sign of a situation that has deteriorated during the past year. The latest moves to block military aid (by place hold of the money or ask for a review) to the LAF came shortly before the deadly incident on the Israeli-Lebanese border on August 3 when an Israeli officer, two Lebanese soldiers and a Lebanese journalist were killed. That incident underscored the unease within the US congress about the ongoing attempts to infiltrate the LAF by the Hizb’allah movement. The Iranian-supported Hizb’allah have for years moved to strengthen its influence within the LAF, especially since LAF deployed in the south along the border with Israel. Lebanese sources have tried to highlight these trends for some time, and it put both the US administration and the Lebanese government in a fix. Since 2007 (and even before that, but on a smaller scale) the US have tried to bolster the LAF as a viable force that could help the Lebanese government as well as building up a domestic capacity to stand up to the Hizb’allah, if need be. That goal has not been achieved yet, by a long shot. Hizb’allah is still the dominant military (and political) force in Lebanon and the LAF is still far too weak to seriously challenge the Hizb’allah. There are very few signs that this is about to change in the near future. And with the continuous moves by the Hizb’allah to gain influence in the LAF, the danger that US-made or paid-for weapons could end up in Hizb’allah hands, is increasing. The moves by congress – by both democrats and republicans – are to be seen as a clear signal to the Obama-administration to sort out its long-term goals and strategic thinking versus Lebanon. It may make sense to help bolster the government of Saad Hariri, but Hariri has been pressed to accommodate the opposition (mainly Hizb’allah) to the extent that they are now part of the cabinet. Thus, any aid to the Hariri-administration might, at least partly, end up in the hands of the opposition. And that is of particular concern when it comes to the military aid to the LAF. Support to Lebanon is obviously a long-term national interest for the US, but the dilemma is that this support may be used in a way that directly contradicts the intention of the US. Lebanese reactions to the moves by the US congress bear this out; both the Defence Miniter as well as the army chief rejected the accusations of Hizb’allah interference and also said that Lebanon will not accept any condition on the weapon-transfers (including non-use against Israel for example). Of even more concern were the immediate announcement from the Iranians ambassador to Lebanon that said – at a meeting with the army chief – that Iran would put up the money to make up for any cuts in US aid. Coming at the heels of the incident in the south when Lebanese soldiers were killed in a direct confrontation with the IDF, it was obviously impossible for the Lebanese government to in any way seem to go against the Hizb’allah, or to seem not to side with its own army (although it was the LAF who initiated the fighting). Thus, the Hizb’alah was quick in sizing the initiative and made the outcome of the incident strengthen its position politically. Whichever way the US turns, it can’t win this fight it seems; if it cut, or limit, the military aid, the consequence is that Iran will probably get a chance to enhance its own influence over the LAF (and, by extension, the Lebanese government). If the US decides to continue with its aid that will do nothing to counter Hizba’allahs slow but persistent work in gaining influence within the LAF. And any US attempts to attach more conditions to the military aid can (as was shown already) be labeled as attempts to infringe of Lebanese sovereignty. The shortcomings of the US policy towards a government one really wants to help has clearly been coming to the fore in the past week. http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=104 Thu, 12 Aug 2010 10:56:00 CEST by Mats Bjore, Infosphere AB ;  In the 28 April 2010 issue  of Forbes Magzine it is stated that there are many government agencies both in the U.S. and around the world who restrict their employees from visiting social networking sites (SNS) through the use of a firewall filter. While some employees honor their organization's policy, many are turning to free proxy services in order to get their daily social networking fix on Twitter, Facebook,YouTube, etc. It is a widely accepted belief from OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) practitioners that these kind of restrictions ultimate effect will be to further isolate the intelligence agencies from the "real" or unclassified world. In our daily operations, we use professional and social network sites to identify and reach out to individuals who may ultimately offer, and be willing to share their expertise, working knowledge and potential network in a collaborative manner to facilitate, promote and share other resources for potential opportunities or joint ventures. Doing it “old school “ would require massive investments in time, money and OpSec (Operational Security) which may ultimately yield very little useable information and/or contacts. Yes, we do understand the problem and risk associated with intelligence officers that use secret compartmented and classified information which may prove to trigger things on the internet; however, it is our belief that these errors and mistakes are caused by lack of training and education in the new cyber operating environment and do not represent a new phenomena. Examples of this date all the way back to the early 90's when seasoned intelligence officers took information from classified material and performed searches on the early day search engines like AltaVista, commercial databases like Dialog and the now defunct Reuters Business Briefing (predecessor to Factiva) We also saw examples of how news from wire services were wiped clean from source and timestamps and then marked as classified; a practice which is still common today in many intelligence services. The fix: BETTER AND SMARTER TRAINING IN REAL OSINT – not the cut and paste and Googlification that we see in so many places. Government agencies could learn a lot from the commercial intelligence activities, since they live an breath publically and legally obtainable information that is coined "OSINT" by the intelligence agencies. And we are all humans 2.0 with the same drive and desire to stay connected and be up to speed with our friends, family and colleagues. This human drive, coupled with today's social media networking sites (SNS) provides for a better quality of life and will exponentially promote our evolution as active participants in today's global society. The end result of this employer restriction and control is and will always be human adaptation to overcome this control. People are now turning to free proxy services like Glype, Tor, and others to reach their Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter feeds. Employees are routinely using their PDA's to communicate via social networking inside the workplace to avoid detection and recourse from their employers and these social media networking sites keep log files. So what is the answer? The answer lies in education, training and employer implemented policy which adapts to new social media phenomena versus waging an expensive and futile effort to control this phenomena. We know, from years of experience, that smart clients and companies use external consultancies and advisors as proxy’s. This is a better and smarter way, but it also poses a question: Should Government agencies that deal with HUMINT and SIGINT deal with OSINT? Would it not be better to outsource this to companies that live and breathe in this kind of environment and may have 50+ commercial clients that actually act as a super proxy, making it impossible for anyone to figure out which client is asking for what and ultimately promotes complete anonymity and operational security? Big consultancies such as McKinsey & Company and Bain, in addition to smaller outfits such as ourselves, Infosphere AB, Sandstone SA and OSINT Solutions enable and promote an environment where you always stay in touch with people and experts around the globe in a dynamic collaborative setup that encourages and feeds an openness. This concept of an environment and culture of openness is not well nurtured in the government intelligence agencies, nor in big international companies internal intelligence operations. True implementation of this concept will require a shift in the "old school" thought process and belief that more classification and over classification is good for the advancement and safety of society as a whole. •We encourage a big “RETHINK” of the OSINT activities and encourage a trusted partnership with commercial companies. •We encourage a model where collection managers within the agencies task external multi-client resources for Direct OSINT (collection on the ground and from local resources). We also encourage robust OSINT systems like Premium versions of Silobreaker where agencies can have a first resort for internet news data on every desktop (Remote news OSINT). •We encourage a training and education for all intelligence analyst so they gain a full understanding of the true meaning of OSINT. The days of a Googlish Cut & Paste report does not make a decision maker nor a military operative happy anymore.       http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=103 Wed, 04 Aug 2010 15:19:00 CEST By Infosphere AB,  The lethal flare-up between units of the Lebanese army (LAF) and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on the morning of August 3 is the most severe border-incident (but not the first) since the summer war in July 2006. It began when the IDF informed the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) that it planned to trim vegetation along the border fence. These trimmings are part of regular maintenance to keep visibility to a maximum as to hinder anyone from using the cover of these bushes in staging attacks across the border. The works were within Israeli territory and south of the international border-line, something confirmed by UNIFIL. The UNIFIL, as is the norm, informed the LAF, who sent a force to the area to observe the works from its side of the border. A few minutes after the work began, the outpost from where the IDF battalion and company commanders were supervising the work, came under sniper fire, killing the battalion commander and severely wounding the company commander. The fire came from a nearby stone-house (close to the Lebanese village Adeisa) and, according to the IDF, must have been prepared several hours before. IDF responded and the LAF troops fled. Hours later LAF-troops fired RPG:s at an IDF tank, but missed. In the ensuing fire from an IDF helicopter, three LAF-soldiers and a journalist were killed. Since the LAF normally refrains from provoking or confronting the IDF, this incident raise a number of questions. It is highly unlikely that the ambush and ensuing RPG-attacks were instigated by a local LAF commander on the scene. Instead, the incident should be viewed in the larger regional context. Coming on the heels of rocket-attacks both towards Ashkelon and towards Eilat (and Aqaba) during the past few weeks, the attack on the Lebanese-Israeli border could very well be a Hezbollah-instigated attempt to keep tension high. Hezbollah has strong interest in keeping tension high and in raise the threat of a broader military confrontation, even if the movement is not necessarily interested in a full-scale war. However, Hezbollah is already under fire in Lebanon for its alleged role in the assassination of former Premier Rafik Hariri. Moreover, the special UN-tribunal set up to probe the murder is scheduled to indict Hezbollah-members. Hezbollah, therefore, has a clear interest in deflecting blame and attention away from this investigation. The incident on August 3 can thus be used to reaffirm Hezbollah’s existence as a resistance movement needed to ‘defend’ Lebanon against Israeli ‘aggression’. This even more so since the LAF-units deployed in the south are forced to bow to Hezbollah ‘rules of engagement’ to be able to function at all in the south. Some information (uncorroborated thus far) from sources within the LAF states that Hezbollah fighters were at the scene during the day, but without being directly involved in the shooting. The same information says that Hezbollah had a significant influence in instigating the incident however. This is plausible since the movement already has an influence over the still fractured LAF. It has, for example, been the policy of the Hezbollah for several years to discharge some fighters after they’ve served a few years in the military wing of the movement and then have them enlist in the LAF to enable Hezbollah to influence both the composition of the army as well as to wield some control over operations, especially in the south. In a wider regional context, this flare-up might also work to the detriment of attempts to renew the direct peace-talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Both Hezbollah and its main backer, Iran (as well as Hamas) is dead-set against these peace-talks. With Arab soldiers being killed by Israelis, these anti-peace forces got some fresh ammunition to use against the PA, should they decide to go ahead with direct peace-negotiations. And even if these talks get off the ground, the scope for making real progress, have diminished. With this incident, Hezbollah will also be able to deflect, or in some instances even stop, criticism towards it. With dead soldiers, killed by the IDF, it is political suicide not to line up behind the LAF, even if one is highly critical of Hezbollah. Thus, Hezbollah can and will use this bloody incident to bolster its position in Lebanon, where it already is strongest player. Furthermore, it is, at the same time, convenient for Hezbollah to hide behind the LAF and let the LAF take the heat. This would make it easier for Hezbollah to play the role of a patriotic Lebanese movement, staying behind the LAF, while it is in reality pulling strings behind the scene. This was underlined in a televised speech on the evening of August 3, when Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah said that : “the Israeli hand that targets the Lebanese army will be cut off”. He also said that Hezbollah told the Lebanese army (LAF) “we are with you” and “will not stay silent” in the face of the “Israeli aggression”. This is a bear-hug the LAF or the Lebanese cabinet can ill afford, but which they can’t escape at this point. http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=102 Wed, 04 Aug 2010 15:16:00 CEST by Infosphere AB, The new START-agreement between the US and Russia has – correctly – been hailed as a small but important step towards a safer world. The agreement still leaves a sufficient number of nuclear war-heads around to destroy everyone several times over, but it nevertheless points to a more compromising attitude between the big powers.  However, the agreement is mainly a tool for the countries already in the nuclear club to use for limiting and scaling back the number of war-heads around. For countries such as Iran the agreement will have no bearing, and it is precisely in a case like Iran that the problems of nuclear proliferation are most vivid. The debates on Iran – and its true goals with its nuclear efforts – have been raging for several years, without any noticeable impact on the regime in Iran. The goal that everyone seems to be in agreement about is to stop Iran from developing the bomb, but there the unity stops. Now, a fourth set of sanctions (by the UN Security Council) are discussed. In the US, the wording of these sanctions has devolved over the past few months from ‘crippling’ to ‘biting’ and now to merely ‘smart’ ones. This last phrasing means that sanctions that hurt the Iranian people are not what the US are interested in according to Ben Rhodes, a deputy national security advisor. That means no to sanctions that curbs, or even stops, shipping gasoline (or other refined petroleum products) to Iran.  But sanctions that do exactly that – stops Iran from getting badly needed refined products – are probably the only real kind of sanction that could still make a difference. The rather lame sanction-regimes decided by the UNSC so far, have consistently failed to make a dent in the Iranian nuclear drive. The new sanctions will not change that. The vagueness of the language used in describing the sanctions – and the continuous scale-down in the US position – is meant to get the Russians and the Chinese onboard. But the price for that are sanctions that are of no real use in getting the regime in Tehran to change. And if the goal is truly to stop the Iranians from getting the bomb (or at least the capacity to build one) then the only other option is the military one. It seems rather incomprehensible that the rulers in Tehran should loose any sleep over the new sanctions planned and the chance is that they will not take any threat of military strikes seriously since the West – and particular the US – seems to be in no mood to challenge them.  The gasoline sanctions are, by far, the best nonbelligerent tool to force a real change in Tehran. And the message from various Iranian opposition groups are that if the West, and the international community at large, is serious about changing the Iranian regime, crippling sanction that bite – even if it hurts the Iranians – are much preferable to military options. This is also a constant message coming from Iran’s Arab neighbors. Just to take a recent example; the former editor of one of the best Arab-language newpapers – al-Sharq al-Awsat – the liberal Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid wrote on February 21 (in that paper): An Iranian bomb…will not be put to military use; it will be used as a way to change the rules of the game. What we are afraid of is Iran’s policy, that uses all means to force its existence (as a regional power), and nuclear weapons is only (one of these) means. He continued: The Ahmadinejad regime aspires to expansion, hegemony, and a clear takeover on the ground, and to do this he needs a nuclear umbrella to protect him from deterrence by (any) superpower (translations by MEMRI) The message read into the weak and sometimes rather incoherent attempts from the West to counter the Iranian regime, is that the West cannot be trusted and that it may be best to gear up for a new sheriff in the Middle East. This means appeasement and, sometimes, a run for cover. Thus, the radical forces, that we say we want to stop and roll back, are gaining more ground. Examples of this happening run from Lebanon to the Gulf-region. It’s a sad testimony to the inability of the West to stand up for its friends and to stand up against its foes.   http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=100 Wed, 21 Apr 2010 11:11:00 CEST by Infosphere AB As the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia is coming under increasing pressure from militant groups inside the country, news are surfacing of developments that could lead to a de-facto break-up of the country. Sources say that the government of Israel is ready to restore the de jure recognition it offered to Somaliland already in 1960 as it eyes the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. According to an Israeli source, an Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman was quoted saying that his government was ready to recognize the break-away republic of Somaliland again. There is a connection of sorts here, between the increased fighting in Somalia and news of Israeli (and possibly other countries) recognition of Somaliland. As pressure mounts on Islamist groups in Yemen, fighters have been trickling into Somalia (some sources are putting the number of fighters in the hundreds and not only from Yemen, but also from Algeria and Iraq) ostensibly to answer calls for help by the Al Shabab in Somalia, but also to escape the Yemenite offensive against AQ-groups in that country. As various networks are established between militant Islamist groups across the region, the Horn is looked upon (and not only by the Israelis) as a region to watch. According to the same Israeli source; “Somalia looks like the Afghanistan of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Israel was the first nation to recognize Somaliland and indeed was the first country the State of Israel has recognized, after it received its Independence from Great Britain. When it unified with Southern Somalia, again we were the first to recognize it. We always wanted a relationship with a Muslim country in East Africa and which we can share the Red sea with.” Many analysts believe Israel has growing national interest in the Red Sea region, a key shipping route. According to well-informed regional sources Israel believes the region is also a key route for arms from Iran for Hezbollah (using the Sudanese regime as a conduit) and a number of other militant groups in Palestine, such as Hamas. The Red Sea also gives Israeli ships access to the Arabian Sea and is within cruise-missile range of Iran. There are also unconfirmed reports suggesting Israel wants to deploy submarines in the Somaliland port of Berbera. The region is well known for its strategic importance and in early April an Al Qaeda spokesman, Said al-Shihri, said “taking control of Bab El-Mandeb, will constitute an escalating victory: the Jews will be crushed in a vise, because it is through the Strait that the United States brings its support to Israel.” Bab El-Mandeb, which means “gates of tears” in Arabic, is a 20-mile long inlet located in the narrowest point of the Red Sea, between the shores of the Horn of Africa and Yemen. The importance of the straits is no secret. Something the former Somaliland president, Mr Ibrahim Haji Egal mentioned in a letter to the former Israeli Premier, Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. Mr Egal saw the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and the importance of Bab El-Mandeb. Mr Egal wrote, 15 years ago: “Today, however, although the West had won the cold war and the threat of communism appears to be vanishing in many parts of the world, we, in the Horn of Africa, are being threatened by a more sinister and pernicious enemy in the form of encroaching Islamic influence.” Mr Egal continued, “my government firmly believes that owing to this region’s strategic geopolitical importance as a result of its propinquity to the oil routes and the narrow Bab El-Mandeb entrance, as well as its proximity to the Gulf, the Middle East and the access to the Indian Ocean.” Egal died May 3rd 2002 in the South African capital Pretoria. He was succeeded by the current leader, Mr. Dahir Rayale, who is said to have avoided approaching Israel in order not to harm Somaliland’s current fragile relations with the Arabs and Muslim world, which it heavily relies on for its only surviving economic engines – livestock. However, many people in Somaliland, especially youths, believe ties with Israel are better for Somaliland’s economic environment because of its economical and technological achievements. Many argue livestock is not a sustainable economy because of health issues, climate change and urbanization and prefer developing an economy based on service and the high-tech sector, similar to that of Israel. Somaliland is the former British protectorate called British Somaliland and received independence on June 26 1960. It was recognized by 34 countries including Israel and the United States. It later joined with South Somalia (a former Italian colony) in a union that was never ratified and which lasted until 1991.   http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=99 Thu, 08 Apr 2010 16:14:00 CEST For constant updates of this issue aorund the Moscow Metro click here http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=98 Mon, 29 Mar 2010 11:41:00 CEST By Infosphere AB, Dr Magnus Norell.  On February 25, officials from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), convened a closed-door seminar in Paris to which this author was invited. The focus of the seminar was to analyze developments in Iran since the election in June last year and to look ahead. Background The NCRI (which is on the US FTO-list together with its largest member-organization, the People’s Mojahedeen Organization of Iran, PMOI ) is one of the largest organized opposition-force outside Iran and encompass over 500 individuals and organizations, from left to right on the political scale. The end-goal is regime-change in Iran and the stated goal is to form a secular republic where the present-day religious powers are completely separated from running the state-structure. There are only two major opposition-groups that are not included in the NCRI; the monarchists and the far left, most notably the Tudeh party. Since the NCRI is opposed to either sheik or Shah, as the slogan goes, meaning that the republic will be based on the separation of Church and State, the monarchists have opted out. However, there are constant contacts between the NCRI and the monarchists (and the communists) and it’s an officially declared policy from the NCRI that anyone who adhere to the basic principles can join. The PMOI was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997 and the inclusion was a goodwill gesture to Tehran and it’s newly elected ‘moderate’ President, Mohammad Khatami. With the election of Khatami it was felt in the US and in Europe that Iran had, for the first time since the revolution in 1979, elected a President that had a real interest in opening up to the West, something that was also admitted by the US administration at the time. Following some pressure from Tehran, the NCRI was added in October 1999, also as a gesture to the regime in Iran. Martin Indyk – who at the time was assistant secretary for Near East Affairs – said of the move that it was intended as a ‘signal’ of US’s desire for rapprochement with Tehran’s reformists. Nothing came of these initiatives however, and it was clear already at the time, that even though Khatami was more open to contacts with the West, he never intended to alter the basic tenets of the Islamic regime. For one thing, Iran’s drive towards a nuclear arms capacity went on without interruption. Also since these two organizations were designated as FTO’s, there have been attempts to remove them from the list. Several bi-partisan initiatives have been launched to change their status and at the time of the listing the PMOI and the NCRI as FTO’s, several members of Congress argued against the inclusion. And as recently as January 12, 2010 the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, heard a challenge to a decision by the Secretary of State to maintain the terrorist designation of the PMOI. Divergences between the US and Europe To complicate matters, the EU has removed the PMOI from their terrorist list (the NCRI was never on the list) creating a disconnect between the major allies at precisely the time when discussions concerning new and tougher sanctions against Iran is at a sensitive moment. This not only complicates policy-making, but it also help the regime in Tehran to play the US and EU off against each other, making a more unified approach to sanctions even more difficult. As things stand right now concerning sanctions, it is highly unlikely that new sanctions, even if an agreement could be found within the Security Council, would severely damage the regime in Tehran. For starters – as for example pointed out in an article at ForeignPolicy.com by Michael Sing on February 28 – the new sanctions are already known due to the very public discussion about them, thus making it possible for the Iranians to counter the impact by preparing for the sanctions in advance. Also, the lack of consequence in closing existing loopholes in sanctions-regimes already in place – as shown for example by Michael Jacobson in PW1639 – are another impediment to an efficient policy that could seriously make the regime in Tehran change its policy. Finally, several companies – on both sides of the Atlantic – are continuing to make business with Iran, thus dulling the effect of any sanctions that are imposed. How deep this problem goes was illustrated by the NYT recently, pointing out that several of these companies were getting US government contracts while doing business with Iran at the same time. It is therefore clear that the present ‘default-position’ by the International Community to reach for unanimity and international consensus is not working, at least not if the goal is to effectively stop Iran from developing a nuclear-arms capacity. With the present negotiations on new and tougher sanctions targeting Iran going on at the UN Security Council, it is clear that if that these new initiatives will have any impact at all, these sanctions must have enough teeth to really affect the regime in Tehran. This is also unlikely both because Russia and especially China are, at least at present, very hesitant to go for tougher sanctions. But it is also unlikely that these new sanctions will force a change in Tehran because, as the US administration has stated officially, the aim is not to have ‘crippling sanctions’ that will affect the people, only the regime. However, this line of thinking rests on the assumption that the regime in Tehran will reform or change by itself. This notion has been shown time and again not to work. ‘Crippling sanctions’ could conceivably have an effect (something that was suggested by the NCRI at the seminar in Paris too) but since that is not in the cards right now, chances are that regime in Iran will have no real difficulties in circumvent the effects of new sanction, should they be imposed. A ‘third way’ to challenge Iran? The recent decade has seen a constant ‘tug-of-war’ between the sanctions and the threat of military action to stop Iran’s nuclear development. No one seriously want a military action (which in any case would probably be a limited action and thus unable to stop Iran’s drive towards a nuclear-arms capacity) and the various sanctions-regimes that have been put in place over the years have not been enough to force a change in Tehran. It is also been clear that a voluntary ‘regime-change’, by way of internal reform, is not going to happen anytime soon. On the contrary, an argument can be made that the regime in Tehran has been able to survive due to the West’s mistaken idea that it will and can change from within. Numerous attempts to reach out to Iran has been met with a cold shoulder and, if anything, a more assertive and aggressive stance towards the West. Since the economic arguments for keeping to trade with the regime has, so far at least, trumped any other arguments of why Tehran should be sanctioned, this will hardly change in the near future. However, since the fraudulent elections last June, the regime has been weakened in that the fault-lines within the ruling elites has become public in a way they haven’t been before. This has made it possible for the opposition inside and outside of Iran to rally around the issue of real regime-change, not only reformation (note for instance how the slogans changed from ‘merely’ protests against the elections to demands at changing the whole regime). The regime is thus pushed into a corner and not only more vulnerable from crippling sanctions (that may not come) but also more vulnerable in the face of the internal opposition and its supporters in the West, such as the NCRI and PMOI, among others. After several attempts to reach out to the regime in Teheran, even after the violence perpetrated by the regime to crush the opposition in the wake of the elections, the time may have come to reach out the Iranian opposition. Helping the opposition to bring democracy to Iran thus directing support to a genuine Iranian force that strives for a real regime change, is something that has not been put to the test yet, despite rhetoric stating the importance of an Iranian-driven opposition as opposed to foreign intervention. Removing the NCRI and the PMOI from the FTO-list would be a beginning. It would not only bring the US and the EU positions into tandem – thus enhancing the chances of a more efficient set of sanctions this time – but it would also send a clear signal to all Iranians that the conduct of the present regime, in the face of opposition, is not tolerated and that support for an organized and democratic opposition is in the interest of the West.   http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=97 Sat, 20 Mar 2010 19:35:00 CET 26 FEB 2010 - by Infosphere AB  In 1990 D.S Richards wrote in his book The Savage Frontier - A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars “In ten years of fighting the mujahiddin have never won a setpiece battle,…..should they be successful…..it will only be at the expense of a prolonged civil war with its inevitable prospects of devastation and starvation”. Already at the time it was possible for a writer, knowledgeable about Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Pashtu tribes along what is today the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, to see what lay in store. Richards’s book is a history of the Anglo-Afghan wars, starting with the first Afghan war 1838-1842. These words quoted above were written 20 years ago when the seeds of today’s war in Afghanistan were planted and allured to the Mujahideen fighting the Russians and their puppet Afghan government. And although parallels should never be taken too far and today’s Afghanistan is different from the one described in Richards book, there are some important similarities that are still being overlooked by today’s foreign occupiers of the country. Or, if not overlooked, not being properly understood. And one of those similarities is the issue of the tribal border-lands along the Afghan-Pakistani border. In the late 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th, during the 2nd and 3rd Afghan war, the British, to their sorrow, realized the importance of the tribal lands along the border between British India and Afghanistan. A constant series of insurgencies, followed by punitive expeditions, failed to resolve the problems and to pacify the area for long. This never really changed until Pakistan and India became independent and Pakistan inherited the tribal lands and their restive population, including a push for ‘Pashtunistan’. And here lies one of the most pertinent questions for today’s war in Afghanistan; without a strategy that take in the situation in Pakistan in general and the FATA and the settled areas of NWFP in particular (including Swat and Buner), the situation in Afghanistan can never be resolved. The Pakistani military offensive in South Waziristan last autumn is a case in point. With minor changes, the communiqués coming out from the Army HQ in Rawalpindi, could have been copied from the British. They talked of insurgent localities destroyed and militants being killed. But no really important leader were caught and, with few exceptions, the insurgents avoided ‘setpiece-battles’ using ‘hit-and-run’ tactics to combat the military. Instead they melted away to fight another day and raised the number of terror-attacks against Pakistani cities such as Peshawar, Lahore and far-away Karachi. Even the capital Islamabad was hit. The offensive was applauded by the allies in Afghanistan, but did little to dent the afghan Taliban’s use of the border lands to escape into FATA. Neither did the offensive succeed in seriously crush the Pakistani Taliban (the Tehrik-e-Taliban) and their ability to seemingly strike at will. The British succeeded a few times in pacify some tribes for a period, but not without striking from both sides of the border, a tactic not employed this time around. The intelligence on the whereabouts of the militants might have been good enough, but the means to the disposal of the Pakistani army was not. But more importantly, some of the more obvious reasons for the lingering resentment of the tribes straddling the border were seemingly overlooked, both by the army brass and their – nominally – superiors in the civil government in Islamabad. The lack of any kind of meaningful strategy to come to terms with the areas backwardness and lack of economic development goes a long way to explain the ease with which the Taliban – on both sides of the Durand line – can recruit people. The region lags behind the rest of the country – a country to which it don’t really belong looking at the way FATA is being ruled through the thoroughly detested Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a legal underpinning stemming from British times – in any measurable way; economic, social and educational (female literacy is for example only 3%, just to take one glaring example). As long as these issues are not dealt with, no long-term solution is possible, either in Afghanistan or in Pakistan. This problem is exacerbated by Pakistan’s attempts to treat the Taliban of Afghanistan more leniently than the TTP (the arrest in Pakistan of Afghan Taliban military chief Abdul Ghani Baradar and two Taliban ‘shadow’ governors do not change this picture), which in Islamabad’s view constitute a real threat to Pakistan. But the complex ties between the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the border; the intricate web of contacts and double loyalties between the ISI and various Taliban outfits and the pressure on Islamabad to take action against the enemies of NATO and the civil re-construction in Afghanistan, makes for a volatile mix that Islamabad has increasingly difficult to handle. At the end of the day, there are no political or military short-cuts that can bypass the Pashtun tribes across the Durand-line. http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=94 Fri, 26 Feb 2010 13:00:00 CET by Infosphere AB  ; At the beginning of February, in the US, a statement by the Director of national intelligence – Dennis C Blair – put the limelight, yet again, on the threat of radical Islamism. Or, rather the confusion of what radical Islamism is exactly. The statement – that there was a high risk of an attempted attack on the US – came in response to a question at a hearing at the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 2.  Too often, radical Islamism is being treated as being equal to terrorism in general. No doubt this is because in today’s world, most international terrorism incidents are tied to radical (or militant) Islamism. And that is what Mr. Blair meant, citing examples from a range of events, including the ‘undie-bomber’ over Detroit on Christmas Day. Overlooking other threats might not necessarily be a sin, as long as one doesn’t completely neglect those other threats. But the focus on radical Islamism does tend to blur the picture of what exactly we’re looking at here. This becomes especially true when – which is frequently the case – this kind of terroristic violence is short-hand for Al Qaeda (AQ). This was the case at the Senate hearing as well. Mr. Blairs assessment zeroed in on AQ’s adaptability to strike in new ways and its ability to change its methods. This was echoed by CIA Director Panetta who said that AQ is adapting its methods in ways that are difficult to detect, with splinter groups gaining importance.  These and other statements raise a number of questions on how the West view international terrorism and to what extent the individuals and organizations tasked with checking them, really know what they are looking at.  First, AQ is not similar to all violent radical Islamism. It is not even in the forefront when one is counting attacks (attempted or successful ones). It has, however, become a house-hold name and has gained the reputation of being a world-wide organization with branches all over. It is that, but only insofar as being a brand-name that a lot of networks, independent groups and sometimes lone individuals, are using to enhance there own roles and strength. By using the name Al Qaeda, a group (or a network or an individual) can tie into a mental and ideological world-view that automatically gives you an assured audience. There is no ‘AQ- central’. But there are numerous ‘splinter-groups’ as Mr. Panetta said, calling themselves AQ. But these groups have been adapting for years and they were de-centralized into its present shape and form long before nine-eleven.  Second, for the Islamist activist, terrorism is not what they are engaged in. it is Jihad, a holy war against an enemy that is trying to subdue a whole religious tradition. And whether we think that is an outrageous statement and a ridiculous conclusion (which is true!), is not necessarily of any consequence for the activist. That Islamic violence in the form of radical Islamism often is pure terrorism does not necessarily mean that the labels can or should be used interchangeably. On the contrary, in order to fully understand the ideological phenomenon of radical Islamism, one needs to separate it from its violent outcome – terrorism. Fighting a political battle, although with a radical agenda, doesn’t necessarily mean that you must engage in violence. The trick is to wean away the radicals, while they are still in a political stage, from the more violent ideological schooling they may end up belonging to. The ‘undie-bomber’ is a case in point. ‘Understand’ here, of course, doesn’t mean ‘accept’. It is still vitally important to battle the ideology as well, even more so than using military means to fight the violent radicals, since nipping terrorism in the bud, is a preemptive strategy that can save a lot of lives. But this has to be done by being more sophisticated and will not be achieved by pumping up AQ to a world-encompassing menace that it isn’t. By calling each and every Islamist-attack an AQ-attack, we do nothing but helping the violent radicals to create an even more formidable enemy.  Third, and lastly, Radical Islamism or Jihadism, is far more than mere terrorism. It is an ideological and revolutionary movement that aims, no less, to overthrow governments and change societies. Terrorism is only the most extreme outcome of that movement. Terrorism is thus the tactical problem where radical Islamism is the strategic threat. It is one way in which Islamism can be reached and imposed on society. It is a tool to achieve sovereignty over Muslim-majority countries.  Islamism is thus first and foremost a political movement and, even if it is tied to a specific religion, Islam, it is not primarily a theological movement. In fact, most Muslims oppose Islamism, not the least because Muslims are more often than non-Muslims the victims of the violent outcome of radical Islamic violence. Therefore, Islamism is only one possible outcome when interpreting Islam, but there are obviously many other interpretations. And while it is true that Islamism’s approach is shaped and justified by basic Islamic texts, it is also true that the scope of other interpretations is wide. As long as these texts are held in such reverence by Muslims, it is probably also true that such an interpretation – to be effective as a weapon against Islamists – needs to be done by qualified clerics. Since the question of what Islam mean can only be decided by Muslims in a process of debate, the outcome of that debate lie well in the future. http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=91 Sat, 13 Feb 2010 19:10:00 CET by Dr Magnus Norell, Infosphere AB Ever since the failed suicide-bombing in the sky over Detroit on December 25, a debate has raged in the US over what went wrong and why. With hindsight, it seems pretty clear that there were several indications (indications that were already in the system; a system developed to nip incidents like these in the bud) that should have triggered a response, barring Mr. Abdul-Mutallab even getting on the flight from Amsterdam; these includes his name on a list with suspects, warnings from his father in Nigeria, and indications from the UK that Mr. Abdul-Mutallab was dangerous.  But apart from the fact that Mr. Abdul-Mutallab was let on-board without going through a proper screening, it is easy to forget that all these ‘signals’ that were received (but not acted upon) before the event, taken individually, could have been interpreted differently. As pointed out in these pages before  today’s highly dispersed, non-state actors like the international Jihadist’s produce an enormous amount of what the Intelligence-world calls ‘noise’. I.e. there is a lot of information out there that, taken together, can make for a very ambiguous picture. All talk of ‘al qaeda’ as if it were a hierarchical organization, don’t help either. The kind of ‘loner’ that Mr. Abdul-Mutallab represents is difficult to detect in the best of cases. This is not to underestimate the mistakes that were made, but is should work as a reminder that not even the best and most sophisticated system is a ‘catch-all’.  The fact that one immediate effect of the incident is that it will be more difficult and cumbersome for people to fly, without really hurting the bad guys, should be food for thought. Apart from being better at putting evident information together (a lesson that should have been learnt long ago), a much more focused and sophisticated approach to detecting terrorists should be the goal. Making travel more difficult in general doesn’t necessarily make it more difficult for potential terrorists to strike.    However, the incident might actually be a blessing-in-disguise for our ability to stop potentially very ugly and atrociously terror-attacks to occur. It serves as a reminder of the difficulties in sorting through all the ‘noise’ (and that ‘noise’ will only rise since new countries are put on the red list) in trying to pinpoint the real threats. But it also points to another danger we face in trying to beat the terrorists; the fact that intelligence analysts often times tend to put data in familiar patterns, thus missing the ‘unexpected’ attack. If we miss the expected attack (and attacks at air-travel are fairly familiar by now), how big might the danger be that we miss signals about the un-expected? Or, put another way in the words of intelligence expert Edwards Epstein: The problem with describing something as an intelligence failure is that it assumes intelligence works, if properly implemented, against a nonhierarchical entity for detecting a one-time event. It doesn’t.  The many ways and means we have developed to make air-travel a real hazzle hasn’t stopped would-be-terrorists from trying. And at the same time, the focus on air-travel may deflect our attention towards other potential targets such as trains, subways or – as actually has been shown – theaters. All places were many non-combatants gather.   http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=90 Sat, 06 Feb 2010 20:52:00 CET by Infosphere AB Exactly 31 years ago  on January 16, 1979  the Shah of Iran left the Peacock throne and went into exile, and eventual death in Cairo. This was the culmination of several months of upheaval, strikes, demonstrations and violence and it opened the way for the birth of the Islamic republic that, like so many other revolutionary movements, soon started to feed on itself. 31 one years later, the world is faced with a regime that is simultaneously oppressing its own people and pursuing an almost apocalyptic world-view including an alleged drive for nuclear weapons. The debate on how to confront this threat is still raging between several academics, governments and policy-makers around the globe. It is no secret that the failings to find a common (at least in the Security Council) stand on Iran has greatly accommodated the Iranian regimes strivings to deflect criticism and avoid serious sanctions to force a change in what is still self-described by the Iranian government as a revolutionary country. There seems to be one major dividing line in these debates. One school of thought argues that the best way of handling the regime in Tehran is to talk and engage with it, thus easing the mind of a regime that is constantly talking about external threats. Of course, the Obama administration is the best example of such a policy, a policy much divergent from its predecessor in the Bush-era. The other school of thought is more inclined to pressure Iran, arguing that any serious talks will only be used by the Iranian regime to play for time and use that time to pursue its nuclear option until they have the bomb, or at least the capability to make one. Developments for the past few years (even before the election of Obama as new US President) seem to bear the second option out; a more cautious Iranian approach after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (with feelers sent out to the US) soon changed when it became clear to the Iranians that they where not next in line. Instead, the drive towards nuclear independency (including the ability to build the bomb and get enough high-enriched uranium to do so) has picked up speed. The prospects for a deal with Iran got a blow when the Iranian regime decided against an agreement its own negotiators had reached with the international community late 2009. So the issue remains; how to deal with the perceived Iranian threat? Engagement has clearly not run its course yet but it looks increasingly difficult to reach an agreement that would seriously limit Iranian capabilities to reach a stage where they can develop or build nuclear weapons. The international consensus on a clear policy towards that end is simply not present. The current inaction or inability to seriously confront the Iranians is clearly visible in both the US and in Europe (where France, the UK and Germany constitute the leading actors). Short of military action  that no-one really wants  is either to come to terms with an Iranian bomb (or capacity to build one), with all the implications of a regional arms-race that that scenario will entail. Or to come up with a series of efficient sanctions that could ultimately force the Iranian regime to change and, in the longer term, maybe lead to a regime-change as well. Such sanctions must focus on the one area where the regime is really very vulnerable: fuel. A sanctions-regime that targeted Iran?s dependency on refined petroleum products from abroad (Iran currently gets 40% of its refined products from abroad due to its lack of domestic capacity to refine) could presumably make sanctions felt. One piece of evidence for that are the strikes and disturbances at the Iranian oil-fields that signaled the fall of the Shah in 1979. Oil, then as today, remains a weak spot for the regime in Tehran and is currently the best avenue to seriously affect the Iranian regime. To be really efficient, however, it needs to be an international effort and that is nowhere to be seen at the moment. Momentum is building for the next-best scenario. The US Congress, moved to act in no small part by the violence occurring since the fraudulent Iranian elections in June last year, recently enacted legislation allowing the US administration to punish foreign companies that do business with the regime in Iran (the bill was passed 412 ? 12 in the Hose in December and the Senate is scheduled to act on it later in January). The change in US policy away from engagement - engagement that, so far at least, have found no takers in Tehran ? stems also from a realization that even a regime dominated by the opposition (however un-likely that is right now) would still be rather hostile to the US and her allies in the region. If these US moves will be enough to get some US allies on-board the sanctions-train remains to be seen. http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=88 Thu, 28 Jan 2010 15:01:00 CET By Infosphere AB In recent months a picture has emerged in the media that International Jihadist terrorism is on the rise. This picture has been promoted by a string of plots aimed at the US, western targets in Afghanistan and, for example, of stories of ex-pats from Somalia returning to fight (and in some cases die) in their country of origin. This is helped by media-hype that is fast forwarding information about attacks around the globe, making even small low-impact events take on seemingly large and much more ominous roles. What’s more; the hyperbole about threats only helps the terrorists and do the work for them, since the goal of terrorism is to spread fear and terror.  This is not to under-estimate real threats emanating from countries like Yemen and Pakistan’s tribal areas. These are hot-spots that need attention and it is clear that the ease with which new recruits can be summoned is an on-going headache for western intelligence agencies. But that is more a sign of the on-going debate or struggle (sometimes violent) within Islam on what and where Islam is going, and how.  Looking at 2009, the US had 10 jihadist plots or attacks inside CONUS. But none of those had any evident links with one another, except for their apparent religious ideological motive. And none of these attacks and plots was driven by any group; instead, the picture that emerges is one of disparate cases and not one of a single powerful coordinated Jihadist group attacking. In fact, it can be argued that this picture of scattered, often rather un-professional attacks may also show that the international Jihadist movement, though still lethal, has lost some capability for large-scale attacks. The jury is still out on this of course, but it is plausible that all the attention and resources aimed at thwarting such attacks, has had an impact.  Very few cases could be directly linked to the tribal regions of Pakistan, and none of those worked. Internationally, the same picture emerges; small, un-coordinated attacks, with no apparent common driver except for the ideology. What there is, is a multitude of smaller groups and networks, often stating their affiliation with al Qaeda, but in effect, doing so just to appear more powerful than they are. al Qaeda has become a catch-call that blurs important distinctions between different groups and individuals. Such as for example, even though these perpetrators might call themselves al Qaeda, their focus is more often than not on a local agenda and not on the Islamic world-revolution the original al Qaeda argues for. Therefore, by taking these statements of affiliation with al Qaeda for granted and using al Qaeda to describe these terrorists, we are rather helping to build up the brand. Since the war in Afghanistan in late 2001, the problem of global Jihadist terrorism has become a lot more decentralized and disparate. It was never the unified organization it was portrayed to be, but after 2001-2, it is even less so. This is not necessarily only good news; it is a lot harder to detect and prevent attacks if those attacks are perpetrated by independent individuals and not instigated, planned and executed by hierarchical organizations. But the lesson here is that this reality calls for more nuanced and sophisticated intelligence-work and less one-size-fits-all security approaches. Such an approach could come a long way in enhancing our understanding of global Jihadism and to find and develop efficient tools to counter and defeat what still is a global problem. http://www.nakedintelligence.org/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=87 Thu, 28 Jan 2010 14:58:00 CET